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Resolving Parental Custody DisputesA Comparative Exploration
D. MARIANNE BLAIR* & MERLE H. WEINER**

I. Introduction
Virtually all nations are guided by the precept that the primary consideration underlying any custody decision must be the best interests of the child.
The commitment to this principle coincides with these nations' international
obligations under Article 3 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC)' and other international instruments.2 The custody law in every state
in the United States also embraces the "best interests" standard,' even though
* Professor of Law and Co-director, Comparative and International Law Center, University
of Tulsa College of Law.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law. Professor Weiner would
like to thank the Luvaas Faculty Fellowship Endowment for supporting her work on this project.
1. Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. Article 3 (1) provides as follows: "In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration."
2. See African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 1, 1990, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/153 /Rev. 2 (1990), art. IV (1) ("In all actions concerning the child undertaken by
any person or authority the best interests of the child shall be the primary consideration");
European Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights, Jan. 25, 1996, Europ. T.S. No. 160,
art. 6 ("In proceedings affecting a child, the judicial authority, before taking a decision, shall:
(a) consider whether it has sufficient information at its disposal in order to take a decision in the
best interests of the child and, where necessary, it shall obtain further information, in particular
from the holders of parental responsibilities; . . ."). Accord Declaration on Social and Legal
Principles relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with special reference to Foster
Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally, G.A. Res. 41/85, U.N. GAOR, 41st
Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 265, U.N. Doc. A/Res/41/85 (1986), art. 5. ("In all matters relating to
the placement of a child outside the care of the child's own parents, the best interests of the
child, particularly his or her need for affection and right to continuing care, should be the paramount consideration.").
3. See Ira Mark Ellman, Chief Reporter's Forwardto PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS xviii (2002).
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the United States is one of the few nations that is not a party to the CRC
or to the other treaties that embody the "best interests" concept.4
Despite worldwide fidelity to a "best interests" approach, the content
and application of the concept differs across and, at times, within borders.
Differences persist notwithstanding that many countries have experienced
a dramatic shift over the last several decades in the types of custodial
arrangements that are thought to best serve children's interests. Some of
the variation between nations is undoubtedly attributable to societal beliefs
concerning children's needs, which are shaped by differing economic systems, religious influences, political forces, and cultural expectations. Other
differences are attributable to the political structure of these countries,
including the various ways in which governments handle legal disputes
generally. When one couples the variations in the substantive meaning of
"best interests" with the differences in the sources of law, procedural
mechanisms, and institutions used to resolve custody disputes, foreign
law related to parental custody disputes can confound even the most experienced family law practitioner.
In this era of globalization, family law practitioners must increasingly
understand the custody norms and procedures that exist abroad. For those
whose practice includes transnational custody litigation, it is particularly
important to develop an awareness of the substantive and procedural similarities and differences in foreign custody law that might assuage or fuel an
initial custody dispute, influence forum selection, justify restrictions related
to visitation conducted overseas, encourage the illegal removal of a child,
and affect the enforceability of an American custody judgment abroad. Even
lawyers without transnational practices, however, can benefit from learning
about a foreign country's custody regime. Such study can offer all family
law specialists sources of ideas for both domestic and international law
reform efforts as well as for arguments on behalf of clients in purely
domestic legal matters.
Although many areas of family law have been subjected to a comparative
methodology,5 the topic of parental custody disputes has received relatively
4. A current list of States Parties to the CRC can be found on the Web site of the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, at http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ ratification/l 1 htm.
5. See, e.g., Special Symposium on InternationalMarriage and Divorce Regulation and
Recognition, 29 FAM. L.Q. 497 (1995) (Lynn Wardle, issue coordinator); LEGAL RECOGNITION OF
SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS (Robert Wintemute, et al. ed. 2002); D. Marianne Blair, The Impact of
Family Paradigms,Domestic Constitutions,and InternationalConventions on Disclosure of an
Adopted Person'sIdentities and Heritage:A ComparativeExamination, 22 Mich. J. INT'L L. 587
(2001); Harry Willekens, Rights and Duties of Underage Parents:A ComparativeApproach, 18
INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 355 (2004); Seymour Moskowitz, Adult Children andIndigent Parents:
IntergenerationalResponsibilitiesin InternationalPerspective, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 401 (2002).
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little comparative analysis in the United States during the past decade,
especially with regard to non-Western nations.6 We therefore chose to focus
this comparative law issue of the Family Law Quarterly on that topic and
solicited papers from many leading family law scholars around the world.
The articles focus on the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities
following parental separation or divorce and represent a cross-section of legal
systems and geographic regions. Each paper is a valuable resource for U.S.
lawyers who seek to understand how custody disputes are resolved abroad.
We invited the authors to address in some fashion the substantive and
procedural norms in their home countries regulating the allocation of custodial rights and responsibilities following parental separation or divorce.
We shared with the authors a list of procedural and substantive issues that
could be addressed at their option. Several of the authors chose to address
each of our questions very directly, while others took different approaches.
Some focused on unique aspects of their laws, engaged in a historical
analysis of forces that shaped their current regimes, or raised challenging
issues that courts or legislatures are currently facing. The differences in
the authors' approaches make the entire symposium, as well as each individual article, an interesting read.
We have decided to begin the symposium with Professor Nigel Lowe's
essay, entitled The Allocation of ParentalRights and Responsibilities-the
Position in England and Wales. While each author had enormous discretion in the format and content of his or her article, Professor Lowe chose
to set forth our questions before each of his responses. Consequently, his
essay conveys information about the questions we asked as well as provides
detailed information about the situation in England and Wales. It serves
as a useful starting point. We then proceed alphabetically through the other
countries and continents.
6. While there have been some excellent comparative and foreign law articles on custody,
we saw a need to examine the issue using a large number of countries from different parts of
the world. We acknowledge, however, that seventeen countries out of approximately one hundred and ninety countries is still a very small number. For insightful comparative analysis see,
e.g., Kirsti Kurki-Suonio, Joint Custody as an Interpretationof the Best Interests of the Child
in Critical and Comparative Perspective, 14 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 183 (2000) (focusing on
joint custody in California, England, Germany, Sweden and Finland); Helen Rhoades & Susan
B. Boyd, Reforming Custody Laws: A Comparative Study, 18 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 119
(2004) (focusing on Australia and Canada). A useful source for a statement of the custody law
in many foreign nations is ANNE-MARIE HUTCHINSON, RACHEL ROBERTS & HENRY SETRIGHT,
INTERNATIONAL PARENTAL ABDUCTION (1998). For a broader review of the "best interests" con-

cept, including some discussion of that concept in various national contexts, see

THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGTS (Philip Alston ed., 1994).

For a source with wide coverage of issues in comparative family law, including information on
custody, see THE CHANGING FAMILY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
LAW (John Eekelaar & Thandabantu Nhlapo eds., 1998).

ON THE FAMILY AND FAMILY
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Whenever a project of this nature is undertaken, there is a very real risk
that critical nuances become lost in translation. Several of the articles
were originally written in languages other than English and subsequently
translated. We have worked extensively with many of the authors in an
effort to clarify their intended meaning and minimize misunderstandings.
Nevertheless, we have been humbled by the realization that any attempt
to describe foreign legal concepts in American English, both for systems
that are similar as well as very different from our own, is fraught with
peril. Even the term "custody," which we use in our symposium title
because of its brevity and familiarity to American lawyers, is unknown in
some countries. For example, Professor Khazova, in her article Allocation
of Parental Rights and Responsibilities after Separation and Divorce

under Russian Law, informs us that Russia has not historically known the
term "custody," although the term is entering the legal vernacular as more
disputes in Russia about children involve Westerners.7 Even in places
where the term is known, "custody" is rapidly being supplanted by terms
like "parental responsibility" and "residence" and "contact" orders.
Professor Lowe explains that in England and Wales this shift in nomenclature is meant to reflect a change from the concept that parents have
possessory interests in children (conveyed by terms such as "parental
rights") to an understanding that parents have obligations and responsibilities for the proper care and upbringing of children.8 Professor
Parkinson, in The Law of PostseparationParentingin Australia, reports

a similar phenomenon in Australia, where the terms "custody" and
"access" were replaced with language that avoids the notion that one parent will exercise power and responsibility to the exclusion of the other
after separation.9
Despite the risks involved in describing foreign law in American
English, we are delighted by the outstanding contributions to this symposium, and we are eager to share some of our own observations that emerge
from this collection of essays. We recognize at the outset, however, that
our observations are broad generalizations, and that occasionally contrary
examples may exist. Even our decision to describe a particular practice as
similar or different among nations may prompt disagreement; most topics
7. Olga A. Khazova, Allocation of ParentalRights and ResponsibilitiesAfter Separation
and Divorce under Russian Law, 39 FAM. L.Q. 373, 376-77 (2005).
8. N.V. Lowe, The Allocation of Parental Rights and Responsibilities-the Position in
England and Wales, 39 FAM. L.Q. 267, 268-69 (2005).
9. Patrick Parkinson, The Law of PostseparationParenting in Australia, 39 FAM. L.Q.
507, 509 (2005). See also Nina Dethloff, ParentalRights and Responsibilities in Germany, 39
FAM. L.Q. 315, 316 (2005), who observes that a 1979 reform in Germany replaced "parental
powers" with "parental care," which encompasses both rights and responsibilities.
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can be framed to produce the opposite conclusion, and ultimately these
characterizations are judgment calls. We also acknowledge that one could
make numerous other observations about these articles. In fact, we hope
that our own observations serve as a starting point for discussion and
encourage others also to plow this fertile body of work.
We begin by highlighting some similarities and trends that we have
observed, discussing two-the notable role of the state and the increased
emphasis on private ordering-in greater detail. We then explore a number of issues related to the importance of the child's opinion in custody
proceedings. This topic provides a useful segway to our discussion of difference, because it illustrates how one issue can reflect both substantial
consensus as well as substantial difference in the manner in which nations
approach it. We conclude by examining some areas of difference that
emerge from these articles, including substantive norms used to allocate
custody between parents and approaches to joint custody.

II. Similarities Among Nations
Even a cursory review of the symposium articles suggests that all around
the globe, the law related to parental rights and responsibilities is dynamic.
Many of the authors chronicle reform efforts of the past decade. For example, in The ParentalRelationship in BrazilianLaw: A Study of Custody, "
Professor Pereira discusses the influence of the 1988 Constitution, international human rights conventions, and children's rights legislation on the
new codification of custody standards in Brazil's 2002 Civil Code. The 2002
Code rejects the marital fault principles that formerly controlled Brazilian
custody adjudications, and emphasizes instead the welfare of the child and
the importance of emotional bonds. Professor Parkinson likewise describes
a series of reforms in Australia, including institutional changes announced
in 2004. These reforms will produce a new countrywide system of facilities
(Family Relationship Centres) that offer information, advice and mediation
services to couples who are separating, as well as expand mediation services and add more programs, such as contact centers, for high-conflict
families. The Family Relationship Centres, in particular, are intended "to
achieve a long-term cultural change in the ways people resolve disputes
about parenting arrangements after separation."" These examples from
Professor Pereira's and Parkinson's articles reflect the widespread and
ongoing efforts worldwide to adopt substantive and procedural reforms.12
10. Rodrigo da Cunha Pereira, The Parental Relationship in Brazilian Law: A Study of
Custody, 39 FAM. L.Q. 563, 565-70 (2005).

11. Parkinson, supra note 9, at 514.
12. See, e.g., Patricia Begn6, ParentalAuthority and Child Custody in Mexico, 39 FAM.

L.Q. 527, 536 (2005) (discussing 2004 reform of the Mexico City codes to allow intervention
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In addition, the articles reveal that most countries operate on the premise
that the parent-child relationship should endure following the breakup of
the parents' relationship. As Professor Fulchiron stated in his article, Custody
and Separated Families: The Example of French Law, "[R]egardless of

what happens to the married couple, parents are still parents."' 3 Countries
reflect this idea in various ways, including through the articulation of a
child's right to contact with both parents subsequent to the demise of the
parents' relationship,' 4 and through the adoption of penalties for a parent15
who tries to undermine the child's relationship with the other parent.
The commitment by nations to the continuation of the parent-child relationship after the parents divorce or separate, however, is unfortunately
by the attorney general when a parent refuses to allow a child to live with the other parent);
Sandra Burman, Allocating ParentalRights and Responsibilitiesin South Africa, 39 FAv. L.Q.
429, 431 nn. 11-12 (2005) (discussing 2001 reform that requires Family Court papers to be
reviewed by Family Advocates, i.e., state officials who are to safeguard the interests of children
when parents divorce); S.N. Ebrahimi, Child Custody (Hizanat) under Iranian Law: An
Analytical Discussion, 39 FAM. L.Q. 459, 467-68 (2005) (discussing 2002 ratification of a
Parliamentary Bill entrusting hizanat to the mother of children from their birth to the age of
seven); Hugues Fulchiron, Custody and Separated Families: The Example of French Law, 39
FAM. L.Q. 301, 303-04 (2005) (discussing 2002 reform that allows separated parents to reach
an agreement which is then approved by a judge); Cecilia P. Grosman & Ida Ariana Scherman,
Argentina: Criteriafor Child Custody Decision-making upon Separationand Divorce, 39 FAM.
L.Q. 543, 554-55 (2005) (discussing courts' recognition of the legitimacy of joint custody);
Khazova, supra note 7, at 375 (discussing revision of Family Code in 1995); Lowe, supra note
8, at 270-71 (discussing Adoption and Children Act 2002 and its mechanism for allowing
unmarried fathers and step-parents to acquire parental responsibility in certain instances);
Bolagi Owasanoye, The Regulation of Child Custody and Access in Nigeria, 39 FAM. L.Q. 405,
421-22,424, 428 (2005) (discussing the adoption of the Children's Rights Act of 2003 and how,
if it becomes effective, it will apply the best interests principle to all custody cases); Theofano
Papazissi, The Function of ParentalCare and Custody and the Minor's Opinion in Greece, 39
FAM. L.Q. 339, 349 (2005) (discussing 1997 reform that made family courts specific chambers
of the civil courts); Eva Ryrstedt, Custody of Children in Sweden, 39 FAM. L.Q. 393, 394 (2005)
(discussing 1998 amendment to joint custody law so that joint custody can be awarded against
the will of one of the parents); Geoffrey Shannon, ChildCustody Law in the Republic ofIreland,
39 FAM. L.Q. 353, 359, 367 (2005) (discussing the adoption of the Irish Children Act 1997,
which, among other things, promoted the use of alternative dispute resolution in custody cases).
13. Fulchiron, supra note 12, at 302. See also Xia Yinlan, The Legal System of
Guardianshipover Minors in the People's Republic of China, 39 FAM. L.Q. 477, 481 (2005)
("The relationship between parents and their children does not end when the parents divorce.").
14. See Asha Bajpai, Custody and Guardianshipof Children in India, 39 FAM. L.Q. 45051,456 (2005); Dethloff, supra note 9, at 328; Ebrahimi, supra note 12, at 473; Fulchiron, supra
note 12, at 302; Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at 561; Khazova, supra note 7, at 38182; Satoshi Minamikata, Resolution of Disputes over ParentalRights and Duties in a Marital
Dissolution Case in Japan:A NonlitigiousApproach in Chotei (Family Court Mediation), 39
FAM. L.Q. 489, 500-01 (2005); Pereira, supra note 10, at 570. Cf Xia, supra note 13, at 486
(describing it as a right of the parent).
15. See Fulchiron, supra note 12, at 310; Ryrstedt, supra note 12, at 395, 399; Ebrahimi,
supra note 12, at 473-74; Pereira, supra note 10, at 570. But see Lowe, supra note 8, at 284-85,
288 (noting that while it is "a very serious issue" if a parent denies contact between a child and
a parent, only occasionally will preference be given to a parent who is best solely because he or
she is able to facilitate contact).
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not universal,1 6 and the extent to which
the commitment exists with regard
7
to nonmarital children is debatable.'
Another area of similarity that particularly fascinated us was the role of
the state in resolving custody disputes. We observed both an expanding role
for the state in resolving parental custody disputes and, simultaneously, a
shrinking role. Professor Lynn Wardle recognized a similar paradox in his
introduction to the Family Law Quarterly symposium on international
marriage and divorce in 1995. He commented on the increasing dominance
of state authority over religious authority in the area of divorce regulation,
but noted the simultaneous decline in governmental regulation of divorce. 8
That the "state," i.e. civil government, is becoming increasingly involved
in resolving parental custody disputes is most evident in countries that
formally rely upon customary or religious law, and sometimes customary
or religious institutions, to resolve at least a portion of the custody disputes in that country. In some such places, state involvement and control
is not new. Dr. Bajpai, in Custody and Guardianshipof Children in India,
explains that for matrimonial proceedings the government codified the
application of personal law, which is religiously based, and allocated
jurisdiction to the family and district courts, regardless of the personal law
involved.' 9 For some issues, such as the appointment of a guardian pursuant to the Guardians and Wards Act 1890, personal law only applies to
the extent that it is not in conflict with the Act.2 °
A more recent expansion of state authority is evident in other nations.
For example, Professor Burman reports in Allocating ParentalRights and
Responsibilities in South Africa2' that custody issues arising upon disso16. See, e.g., Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 423 (comparing Islamic law in Nigeria, which
has a commitment to access after separation and divorce, to customary law in Nigeria, which
lacks a similar commitment).
17. In some countries, the commitment to the parent-child relationship appears to apply to
nonmarital children after there is some legal recognition of parental status. See, e.g., Ryrstedt,
supra note 12, at 394; Lowe, supra note 8, at 269-71; Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at
544; Papazissi, supra note 12, at 340-41; Khazova, supra note 7, at 377; Fulchiron, supra note
12, at 303, 306; Dethloff, supra note 9, at 318; Xia, supra note 13, at 480. Yet in other countries, and in some of these same countries that express a commitment to treating nonmarital children without discrimination, parents of nonmarital children may have a more difficult time than
the marital parent in some circumstances in securing or maintaining parental authority. See, e.g.,
Burman, supra note 12, at 436; Papazissi, supra note 12, at 340-41; Fulchiron, supra note 12,
at 306; Shannon, supra note 12, at 358-59; Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 423-25; Minamikata,
supra note 14, at 492.
18. InternationalMarriageand Divorce, supra note 5, at 497,512,514. Compare MARY ANN
GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW, & FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND WESTERN EUROPE 197 (1989) (noting the state's increased involvement in the consequences of

marriage dissolution at the same time as the state's involvement in marriage is "withering away").
19. Bajpai, supra note 14, at 445-46, 453-54.
20. Id. at 444.
21. Burman, supra note 12, at 430 (reporting that the Recognition of Customary Marriages
Act 120 of 1998 now requires that customary law marriages be dissolved by civil law courts).
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lution of customary marriages, which until recently were resolved by customary courts or tribal or religious leaders, must now be resolved by civil
law courts. This transition, and the accompanying "clash of values," may
result in certain communities avoiding the civil courts for the resolution
of their disputes.22 Professor Owasanoye observes in The Regulation of
Child Custody and Access in Nigeria23 that custody disputes arising in
customary marriages in his country are still resolved in customary courts,
but that these courts are now regulated by statute and increasingly subject to
appellate oversight by civil courts and substantive norms imposed by civil
law. 24 Although the Shi'a school of Islamic law has greatly influenced
custody law in Iran, Dr. Ebrahimi notes in Child Custody (Hizanat) Under
IranianLaw: An Analytical Discussion25 that Iranian civil legislation now
codifies this religious law and that civil courts resolve custody issues.26
While civil control over custody appears to be growing in many places,
religious courts do continue to have jurisdiction over custody issues in
some parts of the world, but even in those nations, the jurisdiction of religious courts is sometimes concurrent with civil courts.27

While one sees an expansion of the state's authority with regard to custody disputes in many parts of the world, in other places the government
is encouraging private ordering and thereby shifting responsibility for
resolving custody disputes from itself to parents. In fact, in many nations,
no court involvement is required at all if parents can reach an agreement
on custody issues. In Japan, Professor Minamikata reports that if parents
divorce by mutual consent and agree on matters concerning their children,
22. Id. at 433.
23. Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 409-10, 419, 421-22.
24. Professor Owasanoye notes that Sharia law, applied by Sharia courts operating in the
northern part of the country, currently governs custody disputes involving children of an Islamic
marriage in Nigeria. However, model federal legislation, the 2003 Children's Rights Act, if it
is passed by the state legislatures, will oblige Islamic courts to take the Act's principles into
account in issuing custody awards. Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 407, 421-22.
25. Ebrahimi, supra note 12, at 459-63.
26. Egypt has also now integrated its Sharia courts into a national court system, and adjudicates family law matters in its civil courts by judges trained in Sharia law. There is a separate
chamber of the civil court for family law issues affecting the Coptic Christian minority. See Islamic
Family Law, http://www.law.emory.edu/ifl/index2.html. Tunisia, like Iran, has also created civil
legislation based on Islamic family law principles, and granted jurisdiction over family law matters
to civil rather than religious courts. Id.
27. In Israel, for example, Sharia courts have exclusive jurisdiction, conferred by civil statute,
to determine child custody issues between Muslims, but Rabbinical courts share concurrent
jurisdiction with civil courts over child custody issues arising between Jewish parents. Edwin
Freedman, Religious Divorce in Israel, INT'L FAM. L. 19, 21 (2000). An effort was made to
include a paper regarding Israeli custody regulation in this symposium, but regrettably an
unforeseen family emergency and publication time constraints hampered participation by our
Israeli authors.
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their divorce may be registered with the local authority without any judicial or administrative intervention whatsoever in the divorce process. 28 In
Iran, courts only need allocate hizanat if the parents themselves fail to
reach an agreement.29
One way countries are fostering this shift in responsibility is by disconnecting the issue of custody from the divorce action.3 0 For example,
Professor Dethloff observes in Parental Rights and Responsibilities in

Germany3 that divorce decrees no longer require a court ruling on custody unless a parent specifically requests court involvement. Similarly, in
England and Wales, neither divorce nor parental separation affects the allocation of parental responsibility automatically, and no court involvement in
the allocation of custody is required unless the parents apply to the court for
a residence order. In fact, the 1989 Children's Act incorporates a Non-intervention Principle, directing courts to make no order unless doing so "would
be better for the child than making no order at all." Professor Lowe suggests
that this language was adopted to discourage the practice of routinely entering residence orders following divorce when parents are in agreement.3 2
Similarly, in France, Professor Fulchiron reports that the allocation of
parental authority is a "separate issue from the dissolution of the marriage"
and parents are encouraged to reach their own agreements "which they can
'33
have approved by the court independently of the divorce proceedings.
Yet, as mentioned above, there are sometimes exceptions, and Russia
reformed its law in 1995 so that courts must resolve child-related ques34
tions before granting a divorce decree.
Another part of the effort to shift responsibility for custodial arrangements from the government to parents is the development of procedures
28. Minamikata, supra note 14, at 490-91.
29. Ebrahimi, supra note 12, at 466.
30. In some places, parents are de facto encouraged to reach an agreement, even if not de
jure. For example, in Nigeria, the "high cost of litigation and the slow process" discourage most
people from seeking a resolution in court. Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 412. In many places
the resolution of custody disputes is marked by a high degree of flexibility, and one might opine
that the indeterminate nature of the "best interests" inquiry itself encourages settlement. As to
the individualized nature of the process, see, e.g., Pereira, supra note 10, at 569-71; Grosman
& Scherman, supra note 12, at 549; Bajpai, supra note 14, at 456; Minamikata, supra note 14,
at 495,498-99; Ryrstedt, supra note 12, at 395, 402; Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 410-13, 417;
Lowe, supra note 8, at 280-81; Xia, supra note 13 at 482-83. Some commentators believe, however, that indeterminacy fosters litigation. The Reporter to the ALI Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution does an excellent job of citing and summarizing the literature on this point.
See Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, supra note 3, § 2.02, Reporter's Notes cmt. c.
31. Dethloff, supra note 9, at 319.
32. Lowe, supra note 8, at 268, 273.
33. Fulchiron, supra note 12, at 305. See also Parkinson, supra note 9, at 5 10 (private ordering is "strongly encouraged"); Begn6, supra note 12, at 538.
34. Khazova, supra note 7, at 383.
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and conciliation mechanisms to facilitate agreement.35 For some countries,
these types of mechanisms are very well established. In Custody of Children
in Sweden,3 6 Professor Ryrstedt discusses a service that municipalities are
required to provide for facilitating cooperation talks, a form of voluntary
mediation used in Sweden for over thirty years. For other countries, however, the focus on mediation has been more recent. Professor Begn6, in
ParentalAuthority and Child Custody in Mexico, mentions the role of the
Desarrollo Integral de la Familia (DIF), a public entity, in facilitating
agreements, and also reports that "the most important change in the last
two years is the possibility of submitting a case to a public or private conciliation and mediation service."37

Author after author mentioned these types of alternatives to litigation.
Geoffrey Shannon, author of Child Custody Law of the Republic of
Ireland,3 8 notes that the Irish Children Act of 1997 introduced a variety of
measures to promote alternative dispute resolution, including requiring
solicitors (1) to discuss with their clients the possibility of agreement, the
availability of counseling to assist in reaching an agreement, and the option
of mediation, and (2) to furnish clients with names and addresses of qualified counselors and mediators. Professor Fulchiron describes how France
encourages mediation as part of its effort to have parents reach their own
consensus on the exercise of parental authority,39 and how judges can
order parties into a preliminary session.' Professor Khazova explains that
Russia has a custody and guardianship body, which parents can use to help
them resolve their disputes before they apply to the courts. 41 Other examples of such alternative dispute mechanisms include the Family Court
Mediation Service and the new Family Resource Centres in Australia4 2 and
the required conciliation services in section 8 cases in England and Wales.43
In East Asia, one also sees a similar effort by the state to provide a
process that may encourage parental agreement. In The Legal System of
Guardianshipover Minors in the People'sRepublic of China,' Professor
Xia reports that spouses who believe that they can reach an agreement
35. Arguably the encouragement of private ordering is consistent with nations' international
obligations. Article 18 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child reads, in part, "Parents ...
have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child."
36. Ryrstedt, supra note 12, at 397.
37. Begn6, supra note 12, at 539.
38. Shannon, supra note 12, at 359.
39. Fulchiron, supra note 12, at 304.
40. Id.
41. Khazova, supra note 7, at 382. These bodies are local authorities whose purpose is the
"protection of property and personal nonproperty rights of underage children." Id.
42. Parkinson, supra note 9, at 511, 513-14.
43. Lowe, supra note 8, at 276.
44. Xia, supra note 13, at 482.
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often choose an administrative divorce procedure so that they can receive
mediation assistance from a governmental body. Even those who choose
to divorce through the People's Court, however, will receive some encouragement to settle custody issues. The judge, before ruling, will first attempt
to mediate the issue. In Japan as well, parents who fail to reach agreement
on the residential arrangements for their children are required to go through
the process of Chotei, which involves private sessions with a committee
composed of a family court judge and two lay commissioners. In Resolution
of Disputes over ParentalRights and Duties in a MaritalDissolution Case
in Japan:A Nonlitigious Approach in Chotei (Family Court Mediation),45
Professor Minamikata describes and critiques this process in detail, noting that its high success rate signals both its strengths and perhaps some
of its inherent weaknesses.
The last similarity we note here serves as our transition to our discussion
of some notable differences among nations. The law of many countries
recognizes that decision-makers should hear from children who are capable
of forming their own views,4 6 a principle reflected in Article 12 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.4 7 Yet there is tremendous variation
in the extent and manner in which this happens, as well as the impact of the
child's opinion on the decision. On the one hand, for example, Professors
Grosman and Scherman 48 note that following the incorporation of Article
12's language into the Argentinean Constitution, custody judgments were
rendered void if the trial judge failed to listen to the child express his or her
opinion. In Argentina: Criteriafor Child Custody Decision-making upon
Separation and Divorce, the authors critique judges' implementation of
this requirement, noting both judicial accomplishments and shortcomings.
In contrast, only children over the age of fourteen must be heard in
German proceedings, although courts can choose to hear from a younger
child in person.49 Similarly, the law in Japan only requires that the family
45. Minamikata, supra note 14, at 491, 493.
46. See, e.g., Ryrstedt, supra note 12, at 399; Khazova, supra note 7, at 386; Grosman &
Scherman, supra note 12, at 555-56; Shannon, supra note 12, at 360; Burman, supra note 12, at
434; Parkinson, supra note 9, at 511; Lowe, supra note 8, at 278-79; Papazissi, supra note 12,
at 346-47.
47. Article 12 provides:
(1) States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views
the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of
the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child.
(2) For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard
in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly or
through a representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.
See CRC, supra note 1.
48. Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at 556.
49. Dethloff, supra note 9, at 323.
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court listen to a minor who is fifteen years old or older, although family
50
courts typically hear from children ten years and older.
The methods by which judges receive the children's views also vary
tremendously. In England, for example, the court typically does not interview
children in chambers, but rather relies upon the reports of court-affiliated
officers or local authorities for relevant information. 5 ' A similar situation
exists in Australia, 52 Sweden, 53 and Ireland. 54 Geoffrey Shannon notes that

the Irish courts have frequently avoided a child's personal appearance by
soliciting the child's opinion through social workers or experts even though
the right of a child to be heard in judicial proceedings has constitutional
support. 5 By contrast, Professor Papazissi informs us in The Function of
Parental Care and Custody and the Minor's Opinion in Greece that the
Civil Procedure Code imposes an obligation on the court to meet and discuss
the issue with the minor. This meeting is informal, 56 and typically occurs
after the trial or hearing. 7 Professor Papazissi suggests that judges often feel
that they are ill-equipped for such meetings since they lack the training
possessed by psychologists and therapists.58 Relatedly, in Argentina, the
child must be seen by the judge, although there the judge often hears the
testimony of the child in the presence of social workers and mental health
professionals who assess and interpret the child's needs and words.59
The impact of the child's opinion is yet another difference that emerges.
For instance, Professor Ebrahimi notes that in Iran, the view of a girl of
nine lunar years or a boy of fifteen lunar years is decisive. 6° At these ages,
the youth is considered mature, and hizanat ends, although parents typically care for their children for an additional period of time.6 In Sweden,
a court cannot enforce a judgment against the will of a child age twelve or
older.6" Some courts in Argentina have held that the child's preference
50. Minamikata, supra note 14, at 499.
51. Lowe, supra note 8, at 278.
52. Parkinson, supra note 9, at 512.
53. Ryrstedt, supra note 12, at 401. In Sweden, the child's opinion is normally presented as
part of the social welfare board's investigation, and the child is not heard in court directly.
54. Shannon, supra note 12, at 361, 371.
55. Id. at 360-61.
56. Papazissi, supra note 12, at 347.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 348.
59. Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at 557. It is interesting that the child has a due
process right to information from court officers regarding the significance of his or her opinion.
Id. See also Khazova, supra note 7, at 386 (explaining that questioning of a child under fourteen years old by the judge is performed in the presence of a teacher).
60. Ebrahimi, supra note 12, at 475.
61. Id. at 474-75.
62. Ryrstedt, supra note 12, at 399-401.
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gives rise to a rebuttable presumption regarding custody.6 3 Yet in other
countries, such as China, the child's opinion is merely considered as one
factor among many others, and the judge has discretion as to how much
64
weight it should receive.
In this era of private ordering, countries differ in how, or even whether,
they give effect to the child's right to be heard if the relevant context is a
conciliation or mediation session. Some countries try to include children
in the negotiations of their parents. For example, in England and Wales,
children nine years old and older are "generally expected to attend the
conciliation hearing."6 Yet Professor Ryrstedt explains that children in
Sweden often do not have their opinions considered or heard while their
parents negotiate an agreement, regardless of whether their parents reach
that agreement through formal cooperation talks or through informal conversation. 66 She notes, therefore, a gap in Sweden between the vision of
the children's role and the reality. Professor Minamikata expresses a similar concem and notes that children in Japan are unrepresented and thus
67
"legally vulnerable" during the dispute resolution process of Chotei.
III. Differences Among Nations
The differences mentioned above regarding the child's opinion are
indicative of the diversity that continues to exist in the regulation of child
custody disputes around the world. Many variations among countries
reflect fundamental distinctions in the ways in which family disputes in general are usually handled. As a result, countries differ regarding whether the
topic of custody is regulated at the state or federal level or both,6 8 whether
custody law is fleshed out primarily by the legislature or courts,69 whether
the rules are significantly influenced by a constitution 70 or international
63. Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at 557.
64. Xia, supra note 13, at 483-84. See also Papazissi, supra note 12, at 347.
65. Lowe, supra note 8, at 277. Although this may be the practice, Professor Lowe notes
that "outside the context of court proceedings the child has no right to be heard." Id. at 278.
66. Ryrstedt, supra note 12, at 400, 402-03.
67. Minamikata, supra note 14, at 506.
68. In Mexico, each of the thirty-one states has a separate code that contains provisions on
parental authority. See Begn6, supra note 12, at 527. In Germany, another federation, the law
of parental responsibility is governed by the German Civil Code, which, due to its civil law heritage, regulates these matters in great statutory detail. See Dethloff, supra note 9, at 316-21. In
Argentina, federal law regulates substantive standards, but provincial law regulates procedural
matters. See Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at 558-59.
69. In India, case law appears to be very significant in defining the content of the standard.
See Bajpai, supra note 14, at 447-56. In China, in contrast, the detailed opinions of the Supreme
People's Court do not have the status and effect of law. Xia, supra note 13, at 487.
70. In Ireland, the Constitution has had a significant impact on Irish custody law, due in part
to the constitutional elevation of the marital family. Geoffrey Shannon explores the many ways
in which various constitutional provisions affect not only parental disputes, but also the custody
rights of third parties as well. Shannon, supra note 12, at 353-56, 371.
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law,7" and whether the substantive rules are formally defined, at least in
part, by religion or custom.
For example, while many nations regulate custody through a unitary
legal system, others have adopted systems of personal law that vary the
substantive law and procedures depending upon the characteristics of the
parents or their marriage. Of the nations included in this symposium, India,
Iran, South Africa, and Nigeria all fall within this category. Professor
Owasanoye's description of child custody regulation in Nigeria illustrates
the complexity that can arise in such a system. There federal and state
statutory provisions, derived in part from English law, regulate custody in
the High Courts; general principles of customary law are applied by customary courts, which vary somewhat from region to region depending on
the customs of the area; and two different schools of Islamic law, the Maliki
and the Hanafi, are applied by Shari'a courts in the northern part of the
country. Which legal regime applies to a dispute depends upon the form
of marriage entered by the parents (statutory, customary, or Islamic), and
numerous considerations influence the classification of the marriage for
72
choice-of-law purposes.
Yet apart from these sorts of structural differences, the substantive norms
employed across nations are also somewhat diverse. Parental gender, historically an important factor in most areas of the world, is reported by
many authors to be losing its significance "on paper,"7 3 although some
have observed that in reality, when one considers both uncontested and
contested cases together, mothers still appear to assume a significant share
of the custodial responsibility after parental separation or divorce.74 Some
71. In several nations, the terms of international human rights documents, and in particular,
the CRC, have been incorporated directly into domestic constitutions or statutory law. See, e.g.,
Pereira, supra note 10, at 567-68. See also Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at 544;
Burman, supra note 12, at 432-33; Begn6, supra note 12, at 537.
72. Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 406-10.
73. See Dethloff, supra note 9, at 322; Pereira, supra note 10, at 570; Ryrstedt, supra note
12, at 395. Fulchiron, supra note 12, at 303; Begn6, supra note 12, at 538; Parkinson, supra note
9, at 516; Papazissi, supra note 12, at 345; Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 411-12.
74. See, e.g., Minamikata, supra note 14, at 499 (observing that many Chotei commissioners
still support a maternal-preference approach); Dethloff, supra note 9, at 324 (noting that although
joint custody is conferred in most cases, mothers are still given precedence when sole responsibility is awarded); Khazova, supra note 7, at 386 (noting that mothers receive residence of
children in 90%of the cases); Parkinson, supra note 9, at 517 (noting that mothers receive residence
most of the time, although the number of fathers receiving primary care is increasing, especially
in litigated cases); Burman, supra note 12, at 434 (noting that in practice most children are with
their mothers after separation or divorce); Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at 546-47
(commenting that in 85-90% of the cases, the parents agree or the court decides to award physical
custody and the exercise of patriapotestadto mothers); Ryrstedt, supra note 12, at 395-96 (noting
that for those cases in which sole custody was allocated, most children are in the sole custody of
their mothers).
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nations, however, still retain specific gender preferences, particularly for
young children. In China, a nursing mother of a child under the age of two
is entitled to be the direct guardian of the child.7 5 Islamic law awards a type
of guardianship over children to their father, but provides that mothers shall
have a preference for the physical custody of young children, although the
ages vary within different Islamic schools.76 In Hindu law, the mother is the
preferred custodian of children under five years old.77 Mothers in Argentina
benefit from a rebuttable presumption that they should be awarded custody of children under the age of five.78 Case law in England and Wales
similarly includes a rebuttable presumption that babies should live with
their mothers.79
Gender preferences do not always favor the mother, however. In Nigeria,
while young children are often awarded to the mother if the child was born
into a statutory marriage,8 ° the opposite may be true if the marriage was
formed under customary law. 8' Customary law in Nigeria has traditionally
tied custody to the patrilineal system of inheritance and the dowry process
(also called bride price).82 Fathers are entitled to the custody of their children
following parental separation if the dowry has been paid. In Iran, fathers
83
receive hizanat for children over the age of seven.
A variety of other factors take on special significance in some countries
during the adjudication of these disputes. Under Islamic law, for instance,
a non-Muslim would not be entitled to custody of a Muslim child,' and
mothers can lose their right to custody upon remarriage.85 Ireland also
attaches special significance to the preservation of the child's religious
upbringing, 86 as does Nigeria, where a child will generally adopt the father's
religion.87 In China, sterility of one of the parents, and a history of grand75. Xia, supra note 13, at 483.
76. See Ebrahimi, supra note 12, at 467 (mothers have preference for hizanat of sons and
daughters until the age of seven); Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 422-23 (under the Maliki
school, mothers have a preference for custody of sons until the age of seven, and of daughters
until puberty, and under the Hanafi school, mothers have custody of sons until age seven and
girls until age nine). See also Bajpai, supra note 14, at 443, 445.
77. Bajpai, supra note 14, at 444.
78. Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at 548-49.
79. Lowe, supra note 8, at 283.
80. Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 414. However, the views that developed under customary
law at times impact adjudications under the civil law system. See Owasanoye, supra note 12, at
411-12.
81. Id. at 420-21.
82. See id. at 419-21, for a detailed description of the dowry system.
83. Ebrahimi, supra note 12, at 467.
84. Id. at 466; Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 423.
85. Ebrahimi, supra note 12, at 472; Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 422-23.
86. Shannon, supra note 12, at 363.
87. Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 412 n.25, 416.
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parental assistance in caring for the children during the marriage, are
independent factors that may carry weight. 88
Countries also vary on the weight they give to a number of factors commonly discussed in the United States, including the importance of keeping
siblings together, 89 a parent's superior financial position, 90 and domestic
violence. For example, Professor Parkinson reports that in Australia, domestic violence is an important consideration: "[I]n practice, if a case reaches
a final hearing, then a proven history of violence is likely to weigh heavily
in the court's discretion about primary residence and may lead to the restriction or denial of contact."91 In contrast, Professor Burman reports that there
is a disappointing lack of attention to domestic violence in custody and
access decisions in South Africa. 92
The authors gave substantial attention to the ability of their legal systems
to confer joint decision-making authority and joint residential care following
divorce. Although total unanimity may not exist,93 there appears to be widespread support for the concept that both parents should continue to play a
role in their child's life following a divorce. This view may have driven the
adoption of, or may in fact be driven by, Article 18 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which requires that states ensure that "both parents have
' 94
common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child.
Yet countries vary in the extent to which joint decision-making authority
and joint residential care are essential components of this commitment;
they also vary in how any such joint authority or care is established.
Many nations do not even require a court to explicitly confer joint decision-making authority in a court order following divorce; rather, both parents
automatically retain such authority by operation of law. This is the situation in Russia, and Professor Khazova attributes it to the fact that the right
to raise one's own child is a personal inalienable right of every parent under
Russian legal doctrine.95 Parents are encouraged to make decisions together,
88. Xia, supra note 13, at 484.
89. Compare Papazissi, supra note 12, at 345; Minamikata, supra note 14, at 500;
Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 416, with Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at 550-5 1.
90. In England and Mexico, a parent's superior financial position is irrelevant. See Lowe,
supra note 8, at 289; Begn6, supra note 12, at 538. In other countries, however, it is relevant.
In Nigeria, for example, it is a "paramount consideration." Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 415. In
Russia, it is a consideration, but financial superiority cannot itself be determinative. See Khazova,
supra note 7, at 385. See also Bajpai, supra note 14, at 449, 456; Dethloff, supra note 9, at 322;
Minamikata, supra note 14, at 498. Cf. Xia, supra note 13, at 483 (discussing financial stability).
91. Parkinson, supra note 9, at 522-23. See also Lowe, supra note 8, at 286 (domestic violence is a "highly relevant factor").
92. Burman, supra note 12, at 435.
93. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
94. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 35, at art. 18.
95. Khazova, supra note 7, at 378-79. This right arises for unmarried fathers once legal
parentage is established. Id. at 377.
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and the courts typically only need to resolve disputes regarding the child's
place of residence.96 A similar background rule is seen in Germany,97
England and Wales, 98 Sweden, 99 and Australia, where what we might term
legal custody continues generally to be exercised jointly, although the courts
can make orders about residence, contact, and specific issues.1 00
Several nations have terms for the parental authority that attaches to
parenthood itself, and this authority similarly survives the separation or
divorce of the parents. Although these countries do not call this shared
authority "joint legal custody," a functional analysis suggests that it is
similar. As explained by Professor Begn6, patria potestad imposes an
10 1
obligation "to provide assistance, care and protection to minor children."
As Professors Grosman and Scherman explain, patriapotestad is generally
a doctrine that gives both parents an important role in raising the child,
even when the child lives with only one parent.10 2 The notion of joint
guardianship in Ireland is similar. Every parent is a joint guardian; this
entails decision-making authority and responsibility to ensure his or her
child is protected, guided, and supported. Both parents will have guardianship after a divorce, even though only one may have physical custody.'0 3
In other nations, courts must confer joint decision-making authority
following dissolution."10 In some of these countries, joint decision-making
is becoming the norm. In France, the joint exercise of parental authority
is "the rule." Parents "must exercise their parental function jointly and
equally, as they did during the marriage. Only under unusual circumstances
may parental authority be exercised by only one of the parents, or the child
entrusted to a third party."' 05 Professor Begn6 indicates that joint parental
authority is the preferred resolution in Mexico. 10 6 Countries vary on the
extent to which parental cooperation is a prerequisite to such an award.' 0 7
96. Id. at 377.
97. Dethloff, supra note 9, at 318-19. Professor Dethloff observes that joint parental
responsibility exists in almost 70% of divorced families in Germany that include children. Id.
at 324.
98. Lowe, supra note 8, at 281.
99. Ryrstedt, supra note 12, at 394.
100. Parkinson, supra note 9, at 509.
101. Begn6, supra note 12, at 528. See generally Begn6, supra note 12, at 529-35.
102. Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at 544-45.
103. Shannon, supra note 12, at 354, 356-58, 359.
104. See, e.g., Bajpai, supra note 14, at 452-53 (reporting that a court in India can order both
parents to continue as joint guardians if to do so is in the best interest of the child).
105. Fulchiron, supra note 12, at 302.
106. Begn6, supra note 12, at 538. This gives a parent "the right to oversee the rearing of the
child and to live with the child." Id.
107. Compare Owasanoye, supra note 12, at 417 (discussing need for a reasonable chance
that parents of statutory marriage will cooperate in the future); Dethloff, supra note 9, at 321;
with Ryrstedt, supra note 12, at 394, 398-99; Papazissi, supra note 12, at 344.
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Regardless of whether joint decision-making is conferred by operation
of law or court order, nations differ regarding how much precise decisionmaking authority a recipient actually acquires, especially if that person lacks
significant residential custody. In some countries, such as Sweden, joint custody gives a parent the power to participate in all those decisions falling
within a parent's authority generally. 10 8 The scope of decision-making is
similarly broad in France, Russia, and Mexico. 9 Joint decision-making
authority may have a narrower scope, however, in other countries. In
Germany, it covers acts of "considerable importance," e.g., those that are
permanent or can only be modified with difficulty."10 In Argentina, the doctrine similarly requires joint consent for important decisions, including,
for example, whether a child leaves the country.II
The differences mentioned in the preceding paragraph may lose some
importance, however, since many countries that recognize broad joint
decision-making authority do not actually require joint consent for many
decisions. Professor Lowe explains that in England joint decision-making
is only needed when a statute or case law requires it, such as for major
decisions like the child's removal from the country, the child's adoption,
the child's schooling, the child's name, and certain medical issues. For other
decisions, each parent may act alone. 12 In France, each parent is considered
to act with the consent of the other parent for ordinary acts." 3 Professor
Khazova notes that the lack of a precise allocation of parental rights and
responsibilities in Russia often means that the person with whom the child
resides has "de facto 'custody' over the child, or at least much more power
or 'much more custody.'-114 Sweden stands out as a possible exception.
While everyday decisions can be made by either parent alone, there appears
those that
to be a need to obtain agreement for issues that fall in' between
5
are mundane and those of "considerable importance." 1
There is greater disparity between countries with regard to the availability and utilization of what we might describe in American parlance as
joint physical custody, i.e., the allocation to both parents of substantial periods of residential custody. In Sweden, typically parents take turns caring
for the child, a result of shared legal custody." 6 In France, while alternating
108. Ryrstedt, supra note 12, at 398
109. Khazova, supra note 7, at 379-80; Begn6, supra note 12, at 538; Fulchiron, supra note
12, at 307.
110. Dethloff, supra note 9, at 319.
111. Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at 546.
112. Lowe, supra note 8, at 281-82; See also Parkinson, supra note 9, at 509 (saying the law
of Australia in this regard was modeled on the law of England and Wales).
113. Fulchiron, supra note 12, at 307.
114. Khazova, supra note 7, at 379; See also Fulchiron, supra note 12, at 307.
115. Ryrstedt, supra note 12, at 398, 402.
116. Id. at 396.
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residences has yet to become common, it currently appears to be a favored
disposition in the law. In fact, France's Court of Cassation condemned the
dissociation of legal and physical custody, and the law in 2002 accepted
17
the legality and, arguably preferences, alternating residences.
Other nations, however, have not yet recognized the option for jointcustody arrangements in their legislation. Professors Pereira," 8 Grosman,
and Scherman" 9 report that joint custody is under consideration in Brazil
and Argentina, but it has not yet been formally recognized in either nation
by statute. 120 Professor Minamikata explains that the Japanese Civil Code
does not recognize joint custody, although a court can allocate physical
custody to one parent and legal custody to the other.' 2' Professor Burman
reports that South Africa has the option of a joint physical custody award,
but that it is "mistrusted" and "uncommon.' ' 122 Other countries, such as
England, Wales, India, Australia, and China recognize the possibility of
alternating residences, 23 but in those countries its use still appears rare,
24
although in several it may be on the increase.
IV. Conclusion
We hope that readers will be intrigued by the differences that exist in
our diverse world regarding the substantive norms and procedural mechanisms used to resolve disputes between parents regarding the custody of
their marital children. We expect, however, that readers simultaneously will
marvel at the remarkable overlap that exists between nations on this topic.
We have discovered that the articles convey the following general similarities: the dominance of civil regulation, a clear emphasis on private
ordering, a widespread use of conciliation and mediation procedures, and
attention to the child's role in the decision-making process. There is also
a strong consensus within diverse legal systems that both parents should
continue to play a role in their child's life following their separation or
divorce. Some of the differences are undoubtedly linked to qualities that
give each society its unique character. To what extent children's lives
around the world would be improved by changing some of these differ117. Fulchiron, supra note 12, at 308.
118. Pereira, supra note 10, at 570.
119. Grosman & Scherman, supra note 12, at 546-47, 552-55, 562.
120. Id. at 547, 553-55, 562 (relating that recent court decisions have supported the arrangement, even when parents demonstrate a high level of conflict, and advocating legislative reform
that would formally recognize such an option).
121. Minamikata, supra note 14, at 490, 492.
122. Burman, supra note 12, at 435.
123. Lowe, supra note 8, at 283; Bajpai, supra note 14, at 452-53; Parkinson, supra note 9,
at 518; Xia, supra note 13, at 484-85.
124. Lowe, supra note 8, at 283; Parkinson, supra note 9, at 518.
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ences or unifying further the approaches is an issue for discussion and
debate. The next comparative project may want to address these important
philosophical and empirical questions.
The influence of international instruments undoubtedly receives much
credit for the convergence among countries represented in this volume,
but probably credit also goes to international travel and the World Wide
Web. The airplane and the computer have aided the cross-fertilization of
ideas among lawyers, scholars, and politicians from various nations.
These same mechanisms will undoubtedly help disseminate the contents
of this symposium, and one can only speculate at this point about the
impact these seventeen articles will have on worldwide trends and various
countries' laws, including our own, as readers learn from the observations
and criticisms of these insightful authors.

